Resilience and security: a qualitative survey of urban smart grid architectures by Eder-Neuhauser, Peter et al.
SPECIAL SECTION ON SMART GRIDS: A HUB OF INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH
Received January 13, 2016, accepted January 17, 2016, date of publication February 18, 2016, date of current version March 17, 2016.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2016.2531279
Resilience and Security: A Qualitative Survey
of Urban Smart Grid Architectures
PETER EDER-NEUHAUSER, TANJA ZSEBY, (Member, IEEE), AND JOACHIM FABINI
Communication Networks Group, Institute of Telecommunications, TU Wien, Vienna 1040, Austria
Corresponding author: P. Eder-Neuhauser (peter.eder-neuhauser@nt.tuwien.ac.at)
This work was supported by the TU Wien University Library through its Open Access Funding Program and the research
projects URBEM and SIMULTAN.
ABSTRACT Smart grids require information and communication technology (ICT) in order to control
dynamics in the power grid. However, adding ICT creates additional entry points in vulnerable hard- and
software, increasing the attack surface, and provides distribution paths that can be used by malware for
attacks. This paper provides a qualitative evaluation of smart grid architectures for urban environments,
comparing four topology types based on six quality indicators: resource control, security, resilience,
quality of service, compatibility, and cost. The impact of each power grid topology on the applicability of
ICT components in communication topologies is also considered. We summarize the benefits and drawbacks
of each topology with a focus on the implementation of decentralized and self-organizing structures.
INDEX TERMS Information and communication technology, malware, network topology, power grids,
self-organizing networks, smart grids.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart grids utilize ICT to increase efficiency and reliabil-
ity in the management of dynamic power consumption and
generation. Although ICT allows for new capabilities, it also
increases the attack surface of the smart grid that must be
addressed in order to ensure the security of future energy
networks. Khan et. al. [1] and Yu et. al [2] provide a com-
prehensive survey of technologies, applications, case studies,
architectures, and security issues.
This paper provides a qualitative evaluation of four ICT
topologies based on existing smart grid reference archi-
tectures such as SGAM [3], NIST [4], and BSI [5], [6]
among others. These topologies supplement the existing
power transmission and distribution hierarchy. We analyze
the benefits and drawbacks of each ICT topology in an
urban context using six quality indicators: resource-control,
security, resilience, quality of service (QoS), compatibility
and cost. The four ICT topologies discussed in the paper are
the fully centralized approach, a fully decentralized approach,
an autonomous cells structure and mesh networks. These
have been derived from the existing reference architectures
with a view to ensuring feasible quality of service while
increasing resilience and architecture based security. We aim
to overcome some of the issues of fully centralized and
decentralized approaches by adopting the best of both worlds.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:
Section II discusses the state of the art of the power
grid (energy domain) as well as of communication archi-
tectures (ICT domain). In Section III, we present a threat
model that emphasizes the need for security in critical infras-
tructures, discuss basic vulnerabilities and explain the attack
surface. Section IV considers propagation vectors based on
real world incidents, while Section V looks towards future
developments in the energy domain such as microgrids
and decentralized generation. In Section VI, we propose
four ICT topologies based on the reference architectures
from Section II-B. Benefits and drawbacks are weighed in
Section VII with respect to resilience and security aspects.
Section VIII concludes the paper. The main contributions of
this paper include qualitative comparisons and concrete pro-
posals for smart grid topologies with regard to architectural
vulnerability and security.
II. STATE OF THE ART
The following section provides an overview of power and
ICT infrastructures in todays grids (Fig. 1). Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are present
in the power transmission grid that includes the Ultra-
High-Voltage (UHV) and High-Voltage (HV) levels. The
power distribution grid including Medium-Voltage (MV) and
Low-Voltage (LV) levels does not yet contain ICT. However,
smart devices can be found on the Home Appliance (HA)
level. Wang et al. [7] and Crane et al. [8] argue that
diversity in a system can increase resilience by reacting to
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FIGURE 1. The power grid today.
environmental change through functional compensation;
diversity of architectural styles and communication methods
is thus essential for resilient smart grids.
A. THE POWER GRID TODAY (ENERGY DOMAIN)
The European power transmission grid is a synchronous
power grid that spans 34 countries and is organized by the
European Network of Transmission System Operators for
Electricity (ENTSO-E), a network of numerous transmission
grid operators (TSO) [9], [10]. The power grid was built using
a centralized approach; generation units at the transmission
grid level and consumption subsumed within distribution
grids, which are located subjacent to high-voltage substations
that supply them. Kerber and Witzmann [11] argue that most
urban distribution grids are organized in open rings, allowing
alternative reconnection routes to circumvent faulted parts.
In recent years numerous decentralized renewable energy
generators have been installed at the power distribution
level, following the policies on clean energy such as the
German ‘‘Energiewende’’ [12]. These small generators have
the potential to push fossil power generation at power trans-
mission level, out of the market, leading to a decrease in rotat-
ing masses (generators) in the transmission grid. However,
often unpredictable decentralized generation could result in
voltage fluctuations. Fossil generation thus serves as an emer-
gency reserve in case renewables fall short. In view of the
rising number of decentralized installations, grid operators
increasingly require that renewables also take part in grid
stability. An environment as dynamic as this demands active
control mechanisms, which in turn require communication
systems for management [13].
According to Christiner [14], with the paradigm change
in the energy sector, intraday energy exchange and utility
intervention continue to increase. Today, the power distribu-
tion grids operate increasingly at the limits of their capacity
due to increasing bidirectional power flows. The possibilities
of decentralized generation, controllable loads and power
storage provide flexibility for grid operators but also
require ICT.
B. COMMUNICATION IN POWER
INFRASTRUCTURES (ICT DOMAIN)
ICT is already present in the power transmission grid, which
is organized in a centralized hierarchical structure under
the control of the TSO. Utilities are usually blind below
the MV transformer, that connects the transmission grid
to the distribution grid. According to Igure et al. [15] legacy
SCADA systems experience an increasing number of attacks,
but were developed with a view toward delivering a high
level of performance and meeting network constraints, with-
out taking security concerns into account. Furthermore, their
research shows that almost 70% of the incidents were attacks
originating outside the network.
Several reference architectures for smart grids have been
proposed so far. SGAM [3] offers a holistic approach that
encompasses multiple dimensions ranging from the physical
components all the way to the business level. The BSI [5], [6]
establishes a protection profile for a smart-meter gateway for
network segregation and data handling. NIST [4] outlines
a generic model for security strategies and a centralized
architecture withmeta-level requirements. Ilo [16] divides the
power grid into many microgrids with each its own control
strategy, in order to minimize the amount of communica-
tion. ENISA [17] offers security recommendations, outlines
risks, and challenges, and provides a knowledge inventory.
SG2 (Smart Grid Security Guidance) [18] uses a threat and
risk analysis to explore the impacts of and countermea-
sures against attacks. Key results include a threat catalog
and proposals for countermeasures and effective encryption
and authentication measures. Further, they find that, while
embedded security is immature, reducing the attack surface
may help prevent attacks. The results were combined into
a holistic model that can be extended to future ICT func-
tionalities. Khan et. al. [1] provide a comprehensive survey
of applicable technologies, architectures and security con-
siderations with detailed methods described under the ref-
erences [131], [132], and [193]. Akhtar and Rehmani [19]
survey wireless sensor networks and their power supply
with regard to renewable resources, storage technologies, and
wireless power transfer.
C. WIDE AREA MONITORING SYSTEMS (WAMS)
The North American Synchro-Phasor Initiative (NASPI) [20]
and Kanabar et. al. [21] present recent advancements using
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) as a base technology for
monitoring the power grid. The measurements help achieve
situational awareness and serve as input for control functions.
Most WAMS are organized in hierarchical architectures with
a control center. According to Zhang et. al [10], WAMS
manage the data exchange among control centers and state
estimators, which apply statistical methods to make decisions
based on the collected data. As dynamic renewable and
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distributed energy sources become more widespread,
monitoring functions utilizing WAMS become increasingly
important.
D. ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE (AMI)
According to Dan and Bo [22], AMI collect data on power
consumption and transmit them to the utility company. This
approach allows for automated billing and enhanced observ-
ability in the power distribution grid. Technologies used
to achieve smart metering include power line communica-
tion (PLC), dedicated wire, and public mobile carrier or
wireless networks. Bou-Harp et. al. [23], Yan et. al. [24] and
Khan et. al. [1] list technologies such as Zigbee, WiMAX,
Wifi and GSM as possible means of supporting smart meter-
ing. As mentioned earlier, the BSI [5], [6] defines security
considerations for AMI that use a gateway connecting smart
meters, Wide Area Networks (WAN) and home appliances.
III. THREAT MODEL
The European Commission has declared energy and ICT
alongside water, food, medical and emergency services, pub-
lic order, finances and transportation to be critical infrastruc-
tures [25]. According to the National Critical Infrastructure
Protection Strategy (KRITIS) [26] of the German Federal
Ministry of the Interior, society is vulnerable to a number
of threats, including not only natural events, technical and
human error, but also terrorism and war. This study considers
resilience in smart grids as a means to reduce the impact of
technical failure and natural events. According to NIST [4],
future smart grids require security measures on the basis of
architectural design, among other means against an array, of
typical adversaries for information systems, which according
to NIST includes nation states, hackers, terrorists, organized
crime, non-organized crime, industrial competitors, and dis-
gruntled or negligent employees.
FIGURE 2. Sample threat to smart grid ICT.
Threats such as nation states, organized crime and disgrun-
tled employees will remain even with high security measures
in place, as they can infect critical nodes on higher levels of
the hierarchy. However, decentralized systems and strict poli-
cies may help to prevent incidents arising from such threats.
The main entry points are assumed to be located at the lower
ICT levels which have no physical security measures in place
and are publicly accessible (Fig. 2). If such devices are con-
nected in a mesh network, malware may propagate quickly
even to other networks such as water- or gas-grids (Fig. 3).
We assume that smart grid communication uses secure pro-
tocols for integrity, authentication, and encryption. However,
new security vulnerabilities in soft- and hardware arise every
day and can be exploited by attackers to compromise systems.
Therefore, system architecture should be designed to prevent
or slow the spread of attacks.
FIGURE 3. Incident propagation.
Future smart grids should deploy ICT on a large scale,
mainly on the power distribution level. Figure 2 depicts a
threat to low-level ICT. Devices at this level are installed
in public places, were physical access cannot be effectively
restricted. Such devices can thus be targeted by adversaries
with limited skill and resources and should not be considered
trustworthy. ICT devices installed at the medium voltage
level, which can be locked inside a transformer room, can
be considered more secure. Nevertheless, ICT must impede
malware propagation by implementing vertical and horizon-
tal security:
• Vertical security: Measures against infections of higher
layers in the hierarchy (e.g., smart meter to control
center)
• Horizontal security: Containing the spread of malware
between entities on the same level (e.g., meter to meter)
IV. INCIDENT PROPAGATION AND CASCADING EFFECTS
This section discusses incidents that are considered as attack
vectors on smart grids when triggered intentionally.
Christiner [14] describes the propagation of a broadcast
message from the control system of a gas grid into the power
grid SCADA due to a misconfiguration. The message prolif-
erated, as in a denial-of-service attack. The SCADA system
was unusable until the broadcast had faded out. During this
incident, the grid operators were unable to monitor or control
the power transmission grid. However, no blackouts occurred
thanks to the manual control of TSO employees. This real
world example shows that incidents in one infrastructure can
indeed spread to other infrastructures. However, in future
smart grids the number of nodes will be much higher ren-
dering manual override much more difficult.
Figure 3 shows an incident propagating across different
networks that control otherwise separate grids.
Another example involves a cascade of overloaded power
lines, which resulted in the division of the European power
transmission grid into three islands each with a different fre-
quency. Enough reserve generation was available to maintain
the stability of each island and to resynchronize; however, this
example shows that incidents can propagate across an entire
continent [27].
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Recovering from incidents poses another problem.
Since few black-start-capable power stations are available,
ENTSO-E [30] has developed extensive restoration guide-
lines for the power grid. When rebuilding a collapsed power
grid, its components must first be re-energized and non-self-
sufficient power plants can only be connected after a stable
grid is operational. Bruno et. al. [31] explains the lengthy
process of restarting a collapsed power grid. Klick et. al. [28]
present further research on vulnerable industrial controllers.
According to Burke and Fahey [29], cyber attacks on
power grid controls already occur more frequently today,
unbeknownst to the public.
V. FUTURE APPROACHES IN THE ENERGY DOMAIN
One option open to future power grids is to upgrade open
rings to microgrids that balance and trade energy with neigh-
bors under ICT management. In a decentralized future, many
distribution grids would remain connected to the transmission
grid but should be able to run autonomously in case of a
blackout. In line with the suggestions of Ilo [16], micro-
grids would be able to balance consumption and genera-
tion within their boundaries. Additional demand would be
communicated to neighbors and the TSOs. During times of
insufficient local generation, power would be requested from
alternative sources. Otherwise, consumers would have to be
dropped in favor of grid stability, priority being given to
critical consumers such as water supply or public authori-
ties. In case of a Europe-wide blackout, many microgrids
could run autonomously for a period, helping restore a stable
power grid. Decentralized generation might actually expedite
restoration in this case. However, because regulations render
urban areas intrinsically incapable of sufficient generation,
and consumption density is higher compared to rural areas,
wide ranging blackouts would be expected should the trans-
mission grid fail. Still, water supply and emergency services
could be covered with a small amount of generation and
support recovery when reconnected.
In contrast to the historically centralized power grid, a
fully decentralized approach would have no generation at the
power transmission level, which would be used exclusively
for balancing. The APG report [14] shows that some legacy
power plants must remain in service in order to maintain a
minimum amount of rotating masses. This means that decen-
tralized power generation must increasingly participate in
grid stability. According to Farhangi [32], the future power
system is likely to settle somewhere between a fully central-
ized and a fully decentralized system such that distributed
sources cover most generation with a small base load covered
by bulk generation.
VI. FUTURE APPROACHES IN THE ICT DOMAIN
The following sections discuss possible ICT topologies based
on the reference architectures in Section II-B. Fig. 4 and
Table 1 present a comparison of the ICT topologies according
to power grid hierarchy type. They will be explained in detail
in the following sections. The centralized, cell and mesh
FIGURE 4. Comparison of topologies.
TABLE 1. Control mode comparison at all hierarchy levels.
topologies (Fig. 4-a, b, c) differ at the power distribution
level. All topologies assume that legacy SCADA systems
remain in service at the power transmission level except for
the fully decentralized approach (Fig. 4-d), which requires an
upgrading of the legacy approach to mesh capability.
Silva [33] concludes that centralized star topologies over
distributed mesh networks are beneficial as regards coverage,
capacity, reliability and cost. However, mesh networks trans-
fer data hop-by-hop, which entails redundant paths result-
ing in increased protocol overhead and latencies. While star
topologies are best for scenarios without security threats,
mesh-based resilience becomes a valuable feature if ICT
systems are threatened with failure due to misconfiguration
or attacks. Khan et. al. [1] provide a survey of technologies
for smart metering that can be used for smart grid com-
munications, including Power Line Communication (PLC),
dedicated wires, public mobile carriers or wireless networks.
Cognitive radio in particular can be optimized through the
utilization of many spectra [1].
Six indicators are used to compare the topologies in the
following sections:
• Resource Control: How well is the topology suited to
achieve situational awareness of the processes in the
power grid? How effective is it in managing data, self
organization and optimizing resources?
• Security: How well is the topology suited to prevent
attacks and malware propagation inside networks and
across neighboring networks?
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• Resilience: How well is the topology suited to mitigate
failures of or attacks on ICT components?
• Quality of Service: How does the topology influence
communication quality in terms of protocol overhead
and latency?
• Compatibility:Howwell is a topology suited to interface
with legacy systems? Will an upgrade be necessary?
• Cost: What are the estimated financial (qualitative)
implications for upgrading different topology styles?
FIGURE 5. Smart grid with a centralized topology.
A. CENTRALIZED TOPOLOGIES
Fully centralized architectures (Fig. 4-a and 5) concentrate
and collect all data in a single control center. There may also
be middle boxes that only collect and distribute data without
deciding on actions. When decisions are made in the con-
trol center, all commands are propagated downwards across
all levels allowing for situational awareness and the opti-
mization of resources. However, as shown by ENISA [17],
Kammerstetter et. al. [34], Kupzog [35], Shin et. al. [36]
and Van de Vyver et. al. [37], a centralized topology causes
unacceptable latencies in data transmission, low flexibility,
low resilience, and congestion situations, and has a single
point of failure. For the remaining figures electrical parts are
illustrated in gray and ICT in black.
Although redundant structures can mitigate errors in a sin-
gle control center, planned attacks are not easily overcome by
a backup system.Architecture-based securitymust be consid-
ered in the design, construction and deployment, rather than
being retrofitted. A vulnerability at such a high level can lead
to catastrophic failures. Yet a fully centralized architecture
can provide some level of protection against malware. In cen-
tral topologies, malware cannot spread horizontally, as nodes
are connected only to higher levels. An attack may propa-
gate vertically, but higher layers are usually better protected
(e.g. through firewalls or virtual networks and physi-
cally secured buildings). Furthermore, the heterogeneity of
components on different levels of the hierarchy may foster
resilience. Worth mentioning in this context is the potential
threat resulting from the reuse of hardware, software, and
design in various products from a single vendor. Primarily
aimed at cost reduction, identical software or hardware at
different levels of the hierarchy can allow for malware prop-
agation across hierarchy levels.
Centralized ICT is practicable in some nodes within the
power transmission grid. However, the nodes to be managed
multiply when households with smart devices and distributed
generation are taken into consideration. It would not be fea-
sible to control these via the legacy approach. The central
control node would thus become even more critical than it
is today, and the cost of managing a power grid would be
concentrated at the higher ICT levels, which could be less
costly than it would be to protect many nodes in a distributed
network.
In summary, the benefits of centralized topologies are:
• Resource Control: Central data collection and control
allow overall situational awareness that can be used
toward resource optimization.
• Security: Physical access is controllable at the medium
ICT layer, and direct horizontal propagation is impossi-
ble because of the hierarchical structure.
• Compatibility: Legacy SCADA can be integrated
directly.
• Cost: Higher layers with a smaller overall number of
devices require expensive upgrades, while lower layers
can function without local intelligence.
The drawbacks of centralized topologies are:
• Resilience: Low level systems depend on expensive high
level systems. Redundancy increases resilience against
failure but not necessarily against attacks.
• QoS: Excessive communication demands and long
distances cause latency between nodes.
• Security: Malware may spread vertically undetected
because there is no local control unit for analysis on the
lower level. However, central control is usually better
protected than are distributed units.
B. CELL TOPOLOGY
This section discusses a topology with designated cells
in the ICT domain that match the electrical microgrid
(Figures 4-b and 6). These cells are controlled by a decen-
tralized agent called a cell controller as in the proposal from
Kupzog [35] but with additional competences for security
and resilience. This cell controller is located above the MV
transformer, acting as a master node, data hub and center for
local intelligence, providing additional security functions.
The transmission grid remains under the control of the
legacy SCADA system, which connects to the cell controller
via dedicated uplinks. These uplinks provide information
to SCADA systems in the interest of achieving situational
awareness, but cannot be used to send control signals in
either direction. Each cell acts autonomously, independent of
SCADA control, and may also exchange information with
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FIGURE 6. Smart grid in cell topology.
its neighbors on the same hierarchy level. Thus, SCADA
manages the power transmission grid, while decentralized
cell controllers manage their subjacent local grids. Each cell
consists of several MV transformers that are clustered under
and controlled by one cell controller. The slave nodes collect
and concentrate data for delivery to the cell controller. Smart
metering and other services such as demand sidemanagement
are controlled by the cell controller, which can act as a
virtual power plant. For security reasons services should not
circumvent the cell controller, as they converge data from
lower levels and aggregate it for SCADA, other WAN entities
and neighboring cells.
The cell controller’s functions resemble those of the BSI
gateways specified in [5]. These act as firewalls, segregate
networks, and prevent communication among smart meters.
They are usually located inside locked buildings and thus are
physically more secure than are smart meters. Local control
and containment makes the spreading of malware to higher
layers or to other grids unlikely. As physical security is dif-
ficult to accomplish for low-level ICT devices such as smart
meters, certain threats persist meaning that medium level ICT
such as cell controllers have to deal with compromised nodes.
Customer data or control signals are sent to recipients
external to the cell controller only in aggregated form. Cell
controllers establish a mesh network with other cell con-
trollers in order to add resilience in case of a high level failure.
Because they represent intermediate local control entities,
cell controllers must be well protected against malware infec-
tions. Anomaly detection should be employed locally so that
the cell controller can preventatively warn neighbor cells and
restrict communication. Only necessary data should be com-
municated to other cells or SCADA systems. Communication
via the Internet should only take place through the cell con-
troller. Measurement inputs are divided into critical values
for stability such as voltage (3 phase), current (3 phase and
direction), frequency and phase angle, and non-critical values
for market signals concerning demand-side management:
1P, 1Q, smart meter data, etc. Critical values have priority
for grid stability. As in the traffic light concept in [38], certain
data is prioritized.
Shin et al. [36] argue that the most cost-effective approach
to implementing smart grids is to utilize middleware in com-
mercial communication infrastructures (e.g. GSM networks
or Internet cable). However, running control commands over
shared networks opens the smart grid up to new attack vec-
tors. We argue that security concerns require that higher-
level communication (e.g. with SCADA or between cell
controllers) should use dedicated networks. Shared networks
may be used on the lower levels where physical security is
impossible to achieve. Cell controllers must be able to pro-
vide security functions such as anomaly detection or firewall
functionality, which represent the greatest cost factor in this
topology type.
In summary, the benefits of the cell topology are:
• Resource Control: Situational awareness can be estab-
lished and resources optimized more easily than in fully
decentralized or meshed environments due to the cell’s
hierarchical structure.
• Security: Physically secured cell controllers can con-
trol malware propagation. Restricting communications
among cells and to SCADA systems provides additional
security.
• QoS: Local cell control minimizes data exchange and
solves congestion issues.
• Resilience: Cells are resilient to failures on high levels.
Meshing cell controllers adds resilience, where the fail-
ure of one node does not endanger other cells.
• Compatibility: SCADA can be integrated into cells.
The drawbacks of cells are:
• Resource Control: It is more difficult to establish sit-
uational awareness and optimize resources than in
fully centralized environments. If the electrical topology
changes due to faults, the renegotiation of ICT control is
more complex because many cells are involved.
• Cost: The highest costs occur at the cell controller
level, which have to operate as autonomous entities with
numerous functions. Higher layers need not implement
extensive security as in Section VI-A.
C. MESH TOPOLOGY
The mesh topology (Fig. 4-c and 7) differs from the cell
topology in that all devices are meshed into a dynamic cluster
at the distribution level that may form links across different
types of grids (e.g. electricity, water or gas). Cell controllers
are located on top of MV-transformers and organize local
control as explained in Section VI-B.
In this topology the legacy SCADA system controlling
the power transmission grid remains unchanged, and com-
munication at the power distribution level occurs via a mesh
network with local control units. These decentralized control
units are under the control of the DSO and provide commu-
nication uplinks to higher levels. Meshed devices can form
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FIGURE 7. Smart grid in mesh topology.
a mesh network outside their electrical grid, circumventing
the control of the DSO. As put forward by Christiner [14]
and mentioned in Section IV, broadcast messages can prop-
agate across vast distances and cause problems for other
grid providers. A future smart grid must be able to mitigate
misconfiguration, as such incidents pose a realistic threat in
attack scenarios.
Mesh structures are inherently more resilient to failure than
are centralized structures but harbor the risk that malware
could propagate quickly across different networks. Devices
could be restricted to a geographical location on proto-
col level, but this would diminish the network’s resilience.
Further, Targon [39] argues that mesh networks are less
costly to implement than standard centralized topologies only
under certain conditions. Because every mesh node requires
its own security system, it can be assumed, in accordance
with ENISA [17], that mesh networks are generally more
expensive than centralized topologies.
In summary the benefits of mesh topologies are:
• Resilience: The effects of electrical failures or attacks
on specific nodes can be mitigated by using alternative
nodes and communication links.
• QoS:The high number of available communication links
reduces the probability of congestion, while limiting the
propagation scope reduces latencies.
The drawbacks of mesh topologies are:
• Resource Control: It is more difficult to establish situa-
tional awareness and optimize resources because of the
dispersion of the collection process. Furthermore, the
logical topology may differ from the electrical topology,
causing problems for control functions.
• Security: The high number of communication links sup-
ports malware propagation and its spread to other infras-
tructure grids. Data is sent hop-by-hop through other
nodes that may not be trustworthy.
• QoS: Mesh networks can overcome local bottlenecks
through load balancing. Routing decisions and multi-
FIGURE 8. Smart grid with a decentralized topology.
hop routing can lead to additional overhead . Some
routing protocols may influence latency.
• Compatibility: Legacy SCADA cannot easily be
integrated via uplink into local nodes.
• Cost: The highest costs occur at the decentralized con-
troller level, but security has to be implemented across
all nodes in the mesh.
D. DECENTRALIZED TOPOLOGIES
A fully decentralized architecture (Fig. 4-d and 8) leads to
higher resilience and reduced data congestion thanks to alter-
native paths, but is more vulnerable to malware propagation,
which may spread faster and even infect systems outside the
power grid where similar hardware or software is in use. As
mentioned in Section VI-C, Targon [39] and ENISA [17]
argue that mesh networks are often more expensive in terms
of capital expenditure, especially taking into account the cost
of security functions for every node.
In summary, the benefits of decentralized topologies are:
• Resilience: Local intelligence mitigates the effects of
high level failure and is robust against local failures and
attacks.
• QoS: Local data management minimizes latencies.
Local control minimizes data exchange, and alternative
paths prevent congestion.
The drawbacks of decentralized topologies are:
• Resource Control: Situational awareness and resource
optimization are difficult to achieve, since data is col-
lected locally and must be exchanged with other nodes.
• Security: High connectivity between nodes and identi-
cal hard- and software facilitate the spread of malware
through similar vulnerabilities.
• Compatibility: Extensive retrofitting becomes necessary
if mesh is implemented on the higher layers.
• Cost: Economically unviable costs accumulate at the
high levels of ICT, which must be upgraded to a mesh
network.
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TABLE 2. Mapping of topologies to reference architectures.
VII. COMPARISON SUMMARY
This section provides a qualitative comparison of the ICT
topologies described in Section VI. Table 2 shows the appli-
cability of the ICT topologies discussed for the proposed
reference architectures described in Section II-B. While cen-
tralized and cell topologies can be supported by most models,
mesh and decentralized topologies are not compatible with all
reference architectures. The ENSIA model seems to be able
to support the widest range of topologies. The quality indi-
cators introduced in Section VI are discussed and compared
in Table 3.
TABLE 3. Comparison of topologies over all hierarchy levels.
The main drawback of fully centralized topologies
(Section VI-A, Fig. 4-a) is the potential for communication
bottlenecks between low-level ICT and high-level SCADA.
Furthermore, a central control location is an easy target for
attackers, even if redundancies are implemented. However,
legacy SCADA systems may persist as they are, considering
their low cost.
In the cell topology (Section VI-B, Fig. 4-b), cells oper-
ate autonomously. A local cell controller manages energy
consumption and communication as a master node. Strict
policies prevent malware from spreading vertically beyond
the cell-controller. Horizontal propagation is contained by
limiting communications outside the cell. Each cell is a
small hierarchical structure subjacent to the MV transformer
(and below the medium ICT level) with its controller as the
convergence entity. Many cells are connected via a mesh
network at the medium ICT level for added resilience against
failures in low- and high-level ICT systems.
The mesh topology (Section VI-C, Fig. 4-c) connects all
devices at the low and medium ICT level into one mesh
network. This approach provides better resilience against
equipment failure, but at the cost of decreased containment
capabilities. Further, SCADA systems cannot be integrated
directly except via dedicated gateways. Those would be sim-
ilar to the cell controllers, but would not restrict the formation
of a mesh network across parts of the electrical grid not
directly connected. Even independent grids such as water or
gas grids could participate in the mesh network.
TABLE 4. Comparison of quality indicators.
A fully decentralized topology (Section VI-D, Fig. 4-d)
has its main drawback in malware containment. Malware
may quickly spread to other grids and across hierarchies.
Moreover, today’s power transmission grids are controlled
exclusively by centralized SCADA systems. Upgrading all of
these existing systems for mesh network capability is likely
not economically viable.
Table 3 provides a summary of the quality indicators in
the ICT topologies across all hierarchy levels, providing an
estimation of the impact on different levels of the hierarchy.
Table 4 compares the quality indicators in detail for the four
ICT topologies. It shows the benefits and drawbacks of each
topology as discussed in Sections VI-A through VI-D.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This study provides a qualitative evaluation of smart grid
ICT topologies for urban environments. It presents benefits
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and drawbacks of centralized, decentralized, and two hybrid
topologies based on quality indicators including resource
control, security, resilience, quality of service, compatibility
and cost. Although we find that centralized and decentralized
topologies have benefits in some respects, hybrid topolo-
gies are found to be able to overcome shortcomings in both
cases.
The cell topology provides the most benefits for future
smart grids through the placement of sensitive nodes in
physically secure locations and the hierarchical structure
from the building level to the cell controller. To imple-
ment this topology, electrical open rings would have to be
upgraded to microgrids with corresponding communication
nodes. This allows for situational awareness and control
over the substations and their subjacent low-voltage (LV)
grids, adding resilience during and after a failure. The mesh
network between the local cell controllers yields benefits
for congestion management and resilience. However, local
security measures and physical security in the cell con-
trollers must account for the containment of malware and
spreading.
Finally, utility companies may prefer to purchase key-
ready systems in order to decrease costs, but the reuse of
hardware and software in these systems may replicate secu-
rity vulnerabilities across hierarchy levels. Compartmental-
ization within the ICT architecture can prevent propagation
of malware, while penetration testing can help to discover
vulnerabilities.
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